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Abstract
This paper reconsiders the role of monetary policy in Sweden’s
strong recovery from the Great Depression. The Riksbank in the 1930s
is sometimes seen as an example of a central bank that was relatively
innovative in terms of the conduct of monetary policy. To consider
this analytically, we estimate a small-scale, structural general equilib-
rium model of a small open economy using Bayesian methods. We find
that the model captures the key dynamics of the period surprisingly
well. Importantly, our findings suggest that Sweden avoided the worst
excesses of the depression by conducting conservative rather than in-
novative monetary policy. We find that, by keeping the Swedish krona
undervalued to replenish foreign reserves, Sweden’s exchange rate pol-
icy unintentionally contributed to the Swedish growth miracle of the
1930s, avoiding a major slump in 1932 and enabling the country to
benefit quickly from the eventual recovery of world demand.
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1 Introduction
In the period of the Great Depression, Sweden was widely admired for its
early and strong recovery from the deepest crisis of the 20th century (Fisher,
1935). In fact, the increase in Swedish industrial production from 1933 to
1939 was higher than elsewhere in Europe. However, despite the widely held
admiration of the conduct of Swedish economic policy during this period,
there has not since been any explicit econometric testing of the various hy-
potheses used to account for Sweden’s apparently more benign depression
experience. In particular, the crucial question Charles Kindleberger posed
almost 40 years ago in his classic account of the Great Depression has not yet
been formally addressed, namely “. . . to what extent the recovery represented
simple exchange depreciation in excess of that of the pound, plus spillover
from the British building and later armament boom” (Kindleberger, 1973, p.
182).
In this paper, we attempt to provide an empirical response to this question
by estimating a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for
a small open economy. Despite its relatively simple structure, this model
adequately captures the key dynamics of the factors driving the Swedish
economy in the period under analysis. We show that, by keeping the krona
undervalued, Swedish exchange rate policy helped Sweden avoid a deep slump
in 1932 and enabled it to benefit quickly from the recovery of world demand.
This finding has implications not only for Kindleberger’s original question
but also for the traditional view of Sweden’s monetary policy in the 1930s.
Monetary economists have long considered this as a precursor to modern in-
flation targeting (Svensson, 1995; Bernanke et al., 1999). Our econometric
results, backed by narrative evidence, suggest that this assessment actually
overvalues the purported ingenuity of the Swedish central bank (Sveriges
Riksbank). Archival sources show that the Riksbank was not primarily con-
cerned about price stability but rather about the stability of the exchange
rate, believing that a floating exchange rate would actually hamper economic
recovery. Therefore, the Riksbank simply adjusted the principles of the ex-
isting gold exchange standard to the new conditions following the fall of the
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British pound in September 1931 without undertaking a true regime shift.
Further, the board minutes reveal that the undervaluation resulted from the
desire to replenish foreign exchange reserves in order to arrange the means
to fix the currency to the British pound. Therefore, Sweden’s exceptional
recovery was not a consequence of an innovative monetary policy but rather
a mere byproduct of orthodox reserve accumulation by the Riksbank.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a
brief summary of the historical setting and outlines Sweden’s exchange rate
policy based on the available narrative and statistical evidence. Section 3
explains the model to be used, Section 4 outlines the estimation approach
and the empirical findings, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Explaining the Swedish Recovery
It is well established that economies that abandoned the gold standard at
an early stage of the Great Depression enjoyed a faster recovery (Temin,
1996; Eichengreen, 1992). Sweden was among those lucky countries. In late
September 1931, a week after the fall of the British pound, the Swedish
authorities abandoned the gold standard and let the krona depreciate. Den-
mark and Norway took similar steps and likewise enjoyed a similarly rapid
recovery. By contrast, the countries of the gold bloc (Belgium, France, Italy,
Netherlands, Poland, and Switzerland), which maintained the gold standard
until 1935–36, suffered from protracted economic depression.
Nonetheless, Sweden not only experienced a shorter crisis but also en-
joyed a particularly strong industrial recovery after 1932. In 1937, Sweden’s
index of industrial production was 152 (1929 = 100) while the comparable
indices in Denmark, Norway, and the UK were 135, 130, and 130, respec-
tively (Figure 1). The question is to what extent this growth miracle was
because of economic policy. In the following empirical analysis, we focus
on the exchange rate policy and the effect of foreign demand, as suggested
by Kindleberger. However, the literature has also suggested other explana-
tions, for which Scho¨n (2000) provides a useful survey of the Swedish work.
During the postwar decades, the heyday of Keynesian economics, the most
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popular explanation highlighted fiscal policy. Supposedly, the Swedish Social
Democrats, who came to power in 1932, revived the depressed Swedish econ-
omy by pursuing a model countercyclical policy based on the teachings of the
younger generation of the Stockholm school (including Gunnar Myrdal and
Bertil Ohlin). Actual figures, however, show that the fiscal deficit was too
small to account for the recovery. For instance, to achieve the actual increase
in real GDP of 2,237 million Swedish krona (SEK) (in 1929 prices) from 1932
to 1936 with the changes in fiscal policy observed in the data (Mitchell, 2003,
Tables G5, H2, G6, J1) would have required significantly higher fiscal mul-
tipliers (> 10) than can be found in the literature (e.g. Spilimbergo et al.,
2009). In addition, as in the other sterling bloc countries, Sweden ran a
more or less balanced budget during this period (Almunia et al., 2010, p.
235, Figure 13). Moreover, the size of the government sector was still small
during the period under consideration (an average of 11% of GDP). Clearly,
the Swedish Social Democrats did not implement a new fiscal regime during
this period, and therefore the fiscal policy explanation for Swedish economic
recovery is difficult to uphold.
This leaves us with just two other explanations discussed in the literature.
The first, as advocated by Jonung (1984) and Fregert and Jonung (2004),
focuses on monetary policy. By leaving the gold standard, the Riksbank was
able to free itself from the deflationary train set in motion in 1930 and to
implement a more expansionary monetary policy. In particular, this newly
gained freedom enabled the Riksbank to act as lender of last resort in the
aftermath of the Kreuger crash of March 1932 and to avert a major banking
crisis. Moreover, the Riksbank adopted a new monetary policy framework,
so-called price level targeting, based on the seminal work of the eminent
Swedish economist Knut Wicksell.
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The second explanation is offered by Lundberg (1983). He highlights the
importance of a weak krona throughout most of the 1930s and investigates
why the undervaluation did not cause inflation at an earlier stage of the
expansion. His answer is twofold. First, demand elasticity was rather high,
i.e. foreign customers of Swedish products reacted strongly to the lowering
of prices after the end of the gold standard in 1931. Second, the access to
natural resources (wood, iron ore) was relatively cheap as domestic producers
provided them.
The question is which was more important for Sweden’s recovery, mone-
tary or exchange rate policy. Jonung’s claim that leaving the gold standard
allowed the Riksbank to save the banking system from collapsing and to
pursue a more expansionary policy can hardly be disputed (Bernanke and
James, 1991). However, the Riksbank did not contribute to the Swedish
growth miracle by adopting a modern monetary policy framework.
It is true that, after suspending the gold standard in 1931, the Swedish
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finance minister made a remarkable official statement in which he announced
that monetary policy would from then on be aimed at stabilizing the internal
price level. Because of Sweden’s subsequent excellent economic performance,
the alleged adoption of price-level targeting has since been repeatedly in-
voked as a new model, with some monetary economists even acknowledging
it as a precursor of today’s inflation targeting (Svensson, 1995; Bernanke et
al., 1999). However, Straumann and Woitek (2009) present evidence, both
econometric and narrative, that this positive assessment in fact overestimates
the ambitions of the Swedish central bank. Moreover, they argue that there
was a huge gap between official declarations and the actual pursuit of policy
in that the Riksbank was not primarily concerned about price stability but
rather about the stability of the exchange rate, believing that the recovery
would be hampered by a floating exchange rate. The Riksbank simply ad-
justed the principles of the gold exchange standard to the new conditions
following the fall of the British pound without making a true regime shift.
At first impression, this conclusion appears to be inconsistent with the
volatility of the krona rate vis-a`-vis UK pound sterling (GBP), the currency
of Sweden’s most important trading and financial partner (Figure 2). In the
period ranging from the suspension of the gold standard in late September
1931 to the official pegging to sterling in July 1933, the SEK/GBP rate
appears to fluctuate relatively freely. A closer look, however, reveals that
there were two major attempts to stabilize the krona at the previous parity
rate of 18.16 SEK to the pound. In November 1931, shortly after the ending
of the gold standard, the Riksbank unsuccessfully attempted to prevent the
krona from rising above parity and the exchange rate fell to 19.40 SEK to
the pound. In late 1932, the Riksbank again tried to return the krona rate
to this level, and again the plan did not materialize. Thus, in the first phase
of the depression, the Swedish central bank only seemingly embraced flexible
exchange rates. It is then appropriate to assume the same policy orientation
held for the entire period from September 1931 to the outbreak of the Second
World War.
That the Riksbank gave priority to exchange rate stabilization over price
level stabilization is revealed in a number of letters written by Ivar Rooth,
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Figure 2: Nominal Exchange Rate SEK/GBP
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central bank governor from 1929 to 1948. In late September 1933, he ex-
plained to O.M.W. Sprague, professor of economics at Harvard and tempo-
rary assistant to the United States Secretary of the Treasury:
“My personal opinion is that it is of the utmost importance to the
whole economic life of a nation which like Sweden for its standard
of living is to such a great extent depending upon foreign trade,
to have fairly stable quotations. I think that I dare say that also
in order to get a rising price-level, stable foreign exchanges are
better than the erratic movements of these rates which the world
has suffered from ever since September 1931.”1
Rooth also made it clear to Sprague that a depreciation of the krona resulted
from the need to accumulate foreign exchange reserves after November 1931:
1Archives Bank of England, OV 29/26 (26 September 1933).
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“When we were driven off the Gold Standard in September 1931
we had less gold than usual and hardly any foreign exchange
reserves. As there was then a stipulation in our law that we were
allowed to issue notes to not more than double the amount of
our gold reserve plus 250 million kronor, we could not reduce our
gold holdings. In order to get some hold of the development of
the Swedish exchange and the price level we had to try to build
up a foreign exchange reserve. [...] A consequence of this policy
of ours was that on the whole the foreign exchange quotations
rose.”2
In early 1936, Rooth argued that Sweden pegged the krona rate to sterling
because most foreign business was invoiced in sterling:
“It was particularly important for a small country like Sweden
depending so strongly on its foreign trade to inspire trade and
industry with trust in our currency.”3
In a further statement in February 1938, Rooth wrote to Randolph Burgess,
Vice-President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York:
“Some American professors, e.g. Professor Irving Fisher, believe
that it is an achievement by us in the Riksbank that prices have
been fairly steady up to the middle of 1936. I have told Professor
Fisher before and I am sorry to have to tell you now that what we
have done is merely that we have carried out a fairly conservative
central banking policy. In fact we have never tried to do anything
directly with regard to prices.”4
As British prices were rising in 1936–37 and Sweden was concerned about
importing inflation, the exchange rate policy was put to test. Swedish
economists, including Gustav Cassel and Bertil Ohlin, were publicly suggest-
ing a revaluation of the krona in order to contain the import of inflation, and
2Archives Bank of England, OV 29/26 (26 September 1933).
3Archives Bank of England, OV 29/4 (January 1936). The original text is in German;
unfortunately, the English summary attached to the document is not very accurate.
4Archives Sveriges Riksbank, Rooth papers, Box 129 (10 February 1938).
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investors began exchanging their pounds and dollars for kronor. As a result,
the foreign exchange reserves of the Riksbank dramatically increased, start-
ing in the summer of 1936. The Swedish authorities, however, maintained
parity in order to retain the competitive advantage of Sweden’s exporting
sectors. However, when British prices began to fall in the second half of
1937, investors began selling their krona assets.
Figure 3: Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves of the Riksbank
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In short, the Riksbank wanted to replenish reserves after leaving the gold
standard and was determined to serve the interests of the Swedish export-
ing sector by keeping the exchange rate as stable as possible. However, did
the Riksbank, as Lundberg argues, also maintain the krona rate at an un-
dervalued level? The Riksbank was very successful in building up reserves
immediately after the suspension of the gold standard (Figure 3). This steep
rise in reserves suggests that it indeed may have been the case that the krona
was undervalued. In the first six months of 1929 (that is, before the begin-
ning of the world economic crisis), Swedish gold and foreign exchange reserves
9
amounted to 350 million SEK; by the end of 1935 they reached 1,000 million
SEK. This increase of reserves was so sudden that the Bank of England ob-
served in a memo in January 1936 that “. . . the Riksbank is still holding an
abnormally large share of Sweden’s abnormally large foreign reserves”.5
The dramatic improvement in the trade balance after 1931 is another sign
that the Swedish currency was most probably undervalued. In 1931–32, the
trade balance was extremely negative, as Sweden, as a small open economy,
was suffering immensely from the collapse of world trade (Figure 4). By
1933–34, the trade deficit had disappeared, partly because of the recovery
in exports. In 1932, the worst year of the depression, they amounted to 947
million SEK and two years later in 1934 to 1,302 million SEK. During the
same period, imports increased just 150 million SEK, from 1,155 to 1,305
million SEK.
Figure 4: Current Account Visibles and Invisibles, Sweden
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Looking at the trade changes in more detail, we can see that from 1932,
5Archives Bank of England, OV 29/26: ’Purchases of gold by Sveriges Riksbank’.
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the nadir of the depression, to 1937, the peak of the recovery, Swedish exports
to the UK increased from 242 to 479 million SEK (+98%), to Germany from
90 to 315 million SEK (+250%), and to the USA from 100 to 221 million SEK
(+121%).6 In other words, Great Britain remained Sweden’s most important
trading partner on the eve of World War II, but the German market had
gained in importance from 1932 to 1937. As for the most important economic
sectors, exports of paper pulp, paperboard, and paper increased from 290 to
588 million SEK (+103%), wood and cork from 153 to 262 million SEK
(+71%), base metals from 140 to 322 million SEK (+130%), and mineral
and fossil products from 43 to 240 million SEK (+458%).7 Overall, Sweden
strongly profited from the rising exports of its raw materials (mainly wood
and iron ore) associated with the recovery of world demand.
Figure 5: Change in Real Exchange Rate
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A straightforward approach to test the Lundberg hypothesis would be
to calculate the real exchange rate of the krona against sterling based on
foreign and domestic prices and the nominal exchange rate. As an initial
approximation, we consider only the percentage changes in the real exchange
rate. The results in Figure 5 of this simple exercise are quite clear. Already
in 1930, when the nominal exchange rate was fixed, the Swedish inflation
rate was lower than in Britain, implying a real depreciation of the Swedish
currency. The nominal devaluation in September 1931 then reinforced the
real depreciation. The question remains as to the effects of this depreciation.
3 The Basic New Open Economy Model
In order to support the evidence from Section 2, we estimate a small-scale,
structural general equilibrium model of a small open economy. Our theoret-
ical framework is based on New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM).
This strand of the literature can be regarded as an extension of the New
Keynesian paradigm, which has been used extensively in recent theoreti-
cal and applied work exemplified, for instance, by Clarida et al. (2000) or
Woodford (2003).8 The basis of these models is the optimizing behavior of
representative agents with all featuring monopolistic competition and nom-
inal rigidities. The basic New Keynesian DSGE model has been adapted to
the small open economy setting by Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) and Monacelli
(2005).
Openness and nominal stickiness were among the defining characteris-
tics of the Swedish economy in the interwar period. The ratio of imports
and exports in GDP of about 50% in 1929 provides some indication of the
great importance of international trade for the Swedish economy at this time.
There is also strong evidence of sticky prices in Sweden during the 1930s. For
example, from 1928 to 1933, wholesale prices decreased by roughly 30%, while
consumer prices fell by a little more than 10%. From 1933 to 1937, wholesale
prices increased by almost 40%, while consumer prices crept up by roughly
8An overview of the NOEM literature starting with Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996)
can be found in Lane (2001) or Corsetti (2008).
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8% (Edvinsson and So¨derberg, 2010).
In the following section, we briefly introduce the basic New Keynesian
model that we use in the empirical analysis. More detailed descriptions can
be found in Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005), Gal´ı (2008, Chapter 7) or Walsh
(2003, Chapter 6).
3.1 Households
We consider a small open economy populated by an infinitely lived represen-
tative household. The household seeks to maximize
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Nt), (1)
where β is the discount factor and U(.) denotes the period utility function,
which is defined over a composite consumption index Ct and working hours
Nt. The composite consumption index consists of a Dixit–Stiglitz aggregate
of domestic goods Cht and foreign goods C
f
t ,
Ct =
[
(1− γ) 1a (Cht )a−1a + γ 1a (Cft )a−1a
] a
a−1
(2)
and
Cht =
(∫ 1
0
Cht (j)
θ−1
θ dj
) θ
θ−1
, j ∈ [0, 1]. (3)
The elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods is deter-
mined by the parameter a, and γ is the degree of home bias in consumption
and therefore is a natural indicator of the openness of the economy. More-
over, θ is the elasticity of substitution between domestic varieties. The opti-
mal allocation of expenditures across domestic and foreign goods implies the
demand functions:
Cht = (1− γ)
(
P ht
Pt
)−a
Ct, and C
f
t = γ
(
P ft
Pt
)
−a
Ct, (4)
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where Pt =
(
(1− γ)P h1−a + γP f 1−a
) 1
1−a
denotes an appropriately defined
consumer price index. In addition, the demand function for any domestic
variety j is:
Cht (j) =
(
P ht (j)
P ht
)−θ
Cht , (5)
where P ht =
(∫ 1
0
P ht (j)
1−θ
dj
) 1
1−θ
is the appropriate domestic price index.
The period budget constraint can be written as:
PtCt + Et(Qt,t+1Bt+1) =WtNt +Bt + Tt. (6)
Note that PtCt =
∫ 1
0
P ht (j)C
h
t (j)dj + P
f
t C
f
t . We assume the household has
access to a full set of state-contingent securities traded internationally de-
nominated in the domestic currency. Bt is the nominal payment in period t
from a portfolio of assets held at the end of period t − 1 and EtQt,t+1Bt+1
corresponds to the price of portfolio purchases at time t. The nominal wage
is given by Wt, and Tt is a lump-sum transfer. The remaining optimality
conditions can be rewritten in the convenient form:
−UN(Ct, Nt)
UC(Ct, Nt)
=
Wt
Pt
,
Qt,t+1 = β
UC(Ct+1, Nt+1)
UC(Ct, Nt)
Pt
Pt+1
.
(7)
The first equation describes the optimal intratemporal labor/leisure choice,
whereas the second can be rewritten as a conventional stochastic Euler rela-
tion by taking conditional expectations on both sides and rearranging:
1 = βRtEt
UC(Ct+1, Nt+1)
UC(Ct, Nt)
Pt
Pt+1
, (8)
where Rt =
1
EtQt,t+1
is equal to the riskless nominal return of a one-period
bond paying one unit of the domestic currency in period t+ 1.
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3.2 Domestic and CPI Inflation, Terms of Trade, and
Real Exchange Rate
We assume that the law of one price holds at all times:
P ft = ΞtP
⋆
t ,
where P ⋆t is the foreign currency price of the foreign-produced good and
Ξt is the exchange rate expressed as foreign currency in terms of domestic
currency. The terms of trade (the price of foreign goods in terms of domestic
goods) is defined as:
St ≡ P
f
t
P ht
=
ΞtP
⋆
t
P ht
.
Note that S is equal to one in the steady state; that is, purchasing power
parity (PPP) holds. To consider the effect of an undervalued currency, we
treat log St as an unobservable exogenous stable AR(1) process, which allows
us to estimate the time path of the terms of trade,
log St = ρs log St−1 + ǫ
s
t , ǫ
s
t ∼ N(0, σ2s ). (9)
3.3 Domestic Firms
We assume the existence of a continuum of monopolistically competitive
firms that produce differentiated domestic goods. All firms employ identical
constant returns to scale production functions:
Yt(j) = ZNt(j), j ∈ [0, 1], (10)
where we assume Z = 1 for all firms. Total factor productivity shocks can be
interpreted as reduced-form shocks that can have very heterogenous causes.
In our empirical methodology, we allow for a more general reduced-from shock
as the conventional autoregressive one, hence inclusion into the production
function is unnecessary. We analyze the optimal behavior of the firms in two
steps. First, note that minimizing the cost of production
Wt
P ht
Nt(j) subject
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to producing Yt(j) = Nt(j) implies:
MCt =
Wt
P ht
, (11)
where MC is the real marginal cost of production and Wt/P
h
t the real wage.
In the second step, we describe the optimal price-setting behavior. We
assume staggered price setting as in Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). Only a
proportion (1 − ω) of firms per period receive the random signal that they
are allowed to reset prices. The probability of a newly chosen price being
effective in period t + k is ωk, implying the average duration of a price of
(1 − ω)−1. There is domestic and foreign demand for domestic good variety
j. Firm j faces the overall demand:
Cht (j) =
(
P ht (j)
P ht
)−θ
Yt, (12)
with Yt = C
h
t + C
h
t
⋆
, where the superscript ‘⋆’ denotes foreign demand for
domestic goods. Given all firms face identical demand curves and have the
same production technologies, all firms that are allowed to reoptimize choose
the same price P¯ ht in order to maximize the current value of the profits
generated while the price stays effective:
P¯ ht = argmax
Pht (j)
Et
∞∑
τ=0
ωτQt,t+τ (P
h
t (j)− P ht+τMCt+τ )
(
P ht (j)
P ht+τ
)−θ
Yt+τ . (13)
Note that Qt,t+τ is the appropriate discount factor for nominal payoffs. The
first-order condition for the choice of P¯ ht is:
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(ω)τQt,t+τYt+τ
(
(1− θ)
(
P¯ ht
P ht+τ
)−θ
+ θ
(
P¯ ht
P ht+τ
)−θ−1
MCt+τ
)
= 0.
(14)
This infinite sum can be expressed more conveniently in recursive fashion
using auxiliary variables (Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2004). Using the gross
growth rate of the aggregate price index Πt =
Pt
Pt−1
and the price index for
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domestic goods Πht =
Pht
Pht−1
, we can write the price-setting equation as:
P¯ ht
P ht
=
θ
θ − 1
A1,t
A2,t
. (15)
with
A1,t = YtMCt + ωβEt
UC(Ct+1, Nt+1)
UC(Ct, Nt)
Π−1t+1(Π
h
t+1)
θ+1A1,t+1;
A2,t = Yt + ωβEt
UC(Ct+1, Nt+1)
UC(Ct, Nt)
Π−1t+1(Π
h
t+1)
θA2,t+1.
(16)
The remaining firms have to retain the price from the last period. Note that
this implies a zero steady-state inflation rate, which is what we would expect
under the gold standard. Using the definition of the domestic price index
implies:
1 = (1− ω)
(
θ
θ − 1
A1,t
A2,t
)1−θ
+ ω
(
Πht
)θ−1
. (17)
3.4 International Consumption Risk-Sharing and Mar-
ket Clearing
The foreign country is assumed large relative to the home country. Therefore,
there is no need to distinguish between foreign changes in consumer prices
and overall inflation and foreign consumption and production.9 Consumption
of the domestic good in the foreign country (export demand) is given by:
Cht
⋆
= γ
(
P ht
StP ⋆t
)−a
Y ⋆t , (18)
9More precisely, regard the domestic country as one of a continuum of infinitesimally
small countries making up the world (foreign) economy. This means that the domestic
economy has zero mass in the foreign economy; see Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) for a more
detailed description.
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if foreign households have the same preferences as domestic households. We
assume that log Y ⋆t follows an exogenously given stable AR(1) process:
log Y ⋆t = (1− ρ⋆) log Y ⋆ + ρ⋆ log Y ⋆t−1 + ǫ⋆t , ǫ⋆t ∼ N(0, σ2⋆). (19)
To place some discipline on our analysis, we will later compare the estimated
structural shocks from (9) and (19) with data not used in the estimation.
The existence of complete financial markets implies that movements in
the ratio of marginal utilities in the two countries are related to movements
in the real exchange rate. Noting that the internationally traded securities
are denominated in the domestic currency, the optimal portfolio choice of
foreign households can be characterized by the following Euler equation:
Qt,t+1 = β
UC⋆(C
⋆
t+1, N
⋆
t+1)
UC⋆(C⋆t , N
⋆
t )
(
P ⋆t St
P ⋆t+1St+1
)
. (20)
When combining (20) with the optimal choice of the domestic households
(7), the following condition is derived:10
UC⋆(C
⋆
t , N
⋆
t )
UC(Ct, Nt)
= µΦt, (21)
where µ =
UC⋆ (C
⋆
0
,N⋆
0
)
UC(C0,N0)
(
1
Φ0
)
is a constant that depends on the initial distri-
bution of wealth across countries. Hence, the existence of complete security
markets leads to a simple relationship linking the level of domestic consump-
tion with the level of foreign consumption and the real exchange rate. This is
an alternative way of stating the uncovered interest parity condition, which
can also be derived by combining the first-order conditions of foreign and
domestic consumers for optimal portfolio choice.
Market clearing in the domestic goods market requires:
Yt = C
h
t + C
h
t
⋆
, (22)
10See also Chari et al. (2002). Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) provide different methods
to close small open economy models. However, there are no major differences between the
methods.
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where Yt ≡
(∫ 1
0
Yt(j)
θ−1
θ dj
) θ
θ−1
is an aggregate production index. Moreover,
this output index can be related to aggregate employment. Using the labor
and goods market clearing conditions together with the definition of the
production technology (10), we can derive an implicit aggregate production
function:
Yt =
Nt
ςt
, (23)
where ςt =
∫ 1
0
(
Pht (j)
Pt
)
−θ
dj is a measure of price dispersion.
For subsequent analysis, we log-linearize the system around the deter-
ministic steady-state values. For the period utility function, we choose
U(Ct, Nt) =
C1−σt
1−σ
+
N
1+η
t
1+η
, where σ−1 denotes the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution and η−1 is the elasticity of labor supply.
4 Empirical Analysis
To gain a deeper insight, we estimate the structural small NOEM outlined
above using Swedish data from the 1930s. In doing so, we build on a recent
strand of the literature that deals with the estimation of new open economy
models. A number of different empirical strategies have been applied, in-
cluding that by Ghironi (2000), who applied nonlinear least squares at the
single-equation level to estimate the structural parameters of this model. As
alternatives, Smets and Wouters (2002) based their estimation on a model
matching implied impulse responses with an identified vector autoregressive
(VAR) model, while Bergin (2003, 2006) and Dib (2003) applied maximum
likelihood estimation. Following the contributions of Lubik and Schorfheide
(2006, 2007), Ambler et al. (2004), Justiniano and Preston (2004, 2010), and
Adolfson et al. (2008, 2007), we use Bayesian methods for estimation. This
has the advantage that the estimation need not be based solely on the like-
lihood function. It also allows us to incorporate additional information in a
coherent way via prior distributions. In particular, the use of prior distribu-
tions is helpful when incorporating restrictions on structural parameters in
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the estimation. The linearized system is solved with the generalized Schur
decomposition technique proposed by Klein (2000). The following state–
space representation mapping the unobservable states into the observable
data vector vt is derived:
vt = L
(
wt
xt
)
,
wt = Lwwwt−1 + Lwxxt−1,
xt = Axt−1 + ǫt.
(24)
The vector xt is a collection of the structural shocks of the model consisting
of the the terms of trade shock st and the foreign output shock y
⋆
t . Hence, the
matrix A is equal to diag( ρs, ρ⋆) and the covariance matrix of ǫ is given by
Σ = diag( σ2s , σ
2
⋆). To account for potential measurement error and model
misspecification,11 we add a VAR measurement error et for the estimation as
proposed by Ireland (2004). The empirical model is thus given by:
vt = L
(
wt
xt
)
+ et, (25a)
wt = Lwwwt−1 + Lwxxt−1, (25b)
xt = Axt−1 + ǫt, (25c)
et = Det−1 + ξt, (25d)
where D is a matrix of VAR parameters of the measurement error represent-
ing the off-model dynamics and ξt is a zero-mean vector of disturbances with
covariance matrix Υ.
4.1 Data and Prior Choice
To identify the empirical implications of the model, we use monthly data on
industrial production and inflation for the observation period January 1928–
September 1939. Based on the consumer price index published by the League
11See Schorfheide (2000) for a loss-function based comparison of potentially misspecified
models.
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of Nations, we calculated inflation as the seasonal first differences of the price
index in logs and then demean. Industrial production (seasonally adjusted)
is also from the League of Nations.12 Following Rabanal and Rubio-Ramı´rez
(2005), we calculated the log-deviation from a quadratic trend. The vector
of observable variables for which we derive the state–space representation
consists of vt = [yt, πt]
′. As already emphasized by Sims (1980), strong
a priori restrictions are necessary to identify rational expectation models.
To overcome identification problems, a number of parameters are usually
calibrated (infinitely strict priors used). Out of the 18 parameters of the
model, we calibrate only two: we set the discount factor to the conventional
value of 0.99, and the long-run share of imports in consumption γ to the
sample average (using annual data).
We impose uniform priors with reasonable ranges for the rest of the struc-
tural parameters so as to be as flexible as possible: θ ∼ U(5, 7), η ∼ U(1.5, 3),
σ ∼ U(1.5, 3), a ∼ U(3, 6), ω ∼ U(0.6, 0.8), ρ⋆ ∼ U(0, 1), ρs ∼ U(0, 1),
σ⋆ ∼ U(0.0001, 0.001), σs ∼ U(0.0001, 0.001). For the VAR-component, we
require stationarity and positive semidefiniteness of the matrix Υ.13
To generate the parameter chain, we use the tailored randomized Markov
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method proposed by Chib and Ramamurthy
(2010). This procedure is a modification of the standard Metropolis–Hastings
algorithm (e.g. Chib and Greenberg, 1995). In each simulation step, the pa-
rameters are randomly combined into blocks.14 A proposal draw is gener-
ated from a multivariate t-distribution with a scale matrix derived at the
conditional maximum of the posterior, which is maximized using simulated
annealing.15 The proposal is accepted if the value of the posterior at the
12Data available from the authors upon request.
13In addition, for the Markov chain to converge, we needed to impose a maximum
absolute eigenvalue of 0.6 such that the maximum measurement error variances are less
than 60% of the corresponding observable time series. This is similar but less restrictive
than that found in Garc´ıa-Cicco et al. (2010, p. 2519), who restrict the measurement error
variance to maximally 6% of the observable time series.
14The probability of staying in the same block is set to 0.8.
15The algorithm is a generalization of the Metropolis algorithm (Metropolis et al., 1953)
developed by Kirkpatrick et al. (1983) and Cˇerny´ (1985). For an overview, see e.g. van
Laarhoven and Aarts (1987) or Press et al. (1992, Section 10.9). The parameters of
the algorithm are set as follows: cooling constant 0.4, stage expansion factor 8, initial
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new parameters is higher than for the old parameters. If not, it is accepted
with an acceptance probability drawn from a uniform distribution U(0, 1) to
ensure that we explore the entire posterior distribution.16
4.2 Results
The parameter estimates are summarized in Table 1. The table provides
the posterior means and standard deviations together with the convergence
statistics. Altogether, the priors are updated considerably by the information
in the likelihood. The structural trade shock turns out to be very persistent.
The variance parameters are estimated precisely, with the foreign demand
shock having about twice the standard deviation as the terms of trade shock.
The expected average duration of prices ((1 − ω)−1) is about five years,
highlighting the importance of nominal rigidities in the Swedish economy.
Our focus is on the role of the exchange rate in the strong recovery of
the Swedish economy after 1932. Figure 6 contains the estimated terms of
trade and foreign output in the 1930s. As for the crucial period from 1930
to 1934, when Swedish exports increased and triggered the recovery, we can
observe a strong depreciation of the Swedish real exchange rate.17 From
early 1932 until mid 1935, the mean and nearly all the probability mass of
the estimated terms of trade are located in the region of undervaluation,
indicating a lastingly undervalued Swedish krona by up to 4%. These results
strongly suggest that Sweden’s exporting sectors were profiting to a large
extent from the exchange rate policy of the Riksbank. They are also highly
compatible with the narrative evidence presented in Section 2. The Riksbank
repeatedly expressed its concern over exchange rate stability. By attempting
to keep the exchange rate fixed and accumulating even more reserves, the
Riksbank keep the krona undervalued, which helped boost exports. The
decrease in estimated world output lasting up until 1933 clearly shows the
temperature 10, and initial stage length 4.
16All programs were written from first principles in Matlab Version R2009b. To gain
speed, we coded the Kalman filter to derive the likelihood in C.
17Note that in the log-linear version of the model, the real exchange rate is proportional
to the terms of trade.
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dire consequences of the Great Depression. However, we can also observe the
recovery starting in 1933. Clearly, this also contributed to the recovery.
Table 1: Posterior Distribution of Parameters
Parameter Mean SD NSE Geweke’s χ2
θ 6.333960 0.500391 0.032881 0.462385
η 2.360571 0.413580 0.019320 0.600004
σ 2.588666 0.337404 0.019578 0.578641
a 3.598114 0.526474 0.020807 0.692470
ω 0.983331 0.003471 0.000197 0.639113
ρ⋆ 0.998994 0.000170 0.000002 0.938818
ρs 0.998678 0.000274 0.000011 0.818986
σ⋆ 0.020562 0.005095 0.000260 0.481140
σs 0.010788 0.000745 0.000019 0.918839
d11 0.552966 0.055079 0.003597 0.801800
d21 -0.116966 0.028224 0.001545 0.422040
d12 0.056536 0.048719 0.002976 0.473774
d22 0.618279 0.058291 0.003890 0.905990√
υ11 0.029215 0.003683 0.000221 0.928962
υ21 –0.000165 0.000025 0.000001 0.628313√
υ22 0.006465 0.000961 0.000062 0.857368
Notes: The posterior distribution is based on 100,000 replications, of which the first
50,000 are discarded as burn-in. Second column: mean of posterior parameter distri-
bution; third column: standard deviation (SD); fourth column: numerical standard
error using 15% autocovariance taper (NSE); fifth column: Geweke’s χ2 test (H0: the
mean of the first 20% of the chain is equal to the mean of the last 50% of the chain).
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Figure 6: Estimated State Variables
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Notes: Posterior median, 5th and 95th percentiles of estimated terms of trade and foreign
demand in percentage deviations from the steady state.
Variance decomposition can be used to infer the role of the different shocks
in driving output and inflation. The forecast error decompositions shown in
Figure 7 confirm our claim. At all forecast horizons, the terms of trade
shock plays an important role in explaining output. It is thus nearly as
important as the world demand shock, which is remarkable in a sample that
includes the Great Depression and accounts for about 40% of the overall
forecast error variance at longer forecast horizons. The off-model dynamics
are important at short horizons, while the foreign demand shock contributes
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about half to the explained variance. Inflation is mostly captured by the
off-model dynamics in the short-run but, for longer forecast horizons, the
foreign demand shock is most important and, to a lesser degree, the terms
of trade shock.
Figure 7: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
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Figure 8: PPP vs. Estimated Terms of Trade
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Notes: Left axis is 9-month moving average of monthly real exchange rate (Jan 1929 =
100), right axis is estimated median terms of trade in percentage deviation from the steady
state.
4.2.1 Model Evaluation and Counterfactual Analysis
To see how well the estimated states reproduce the data they are intended
to represent, we plot the terms of trade against the real exchange rate of the
krona against sterling, assuming that the equilibrium exchange rate is the
sample average (Figure 8). The fit is striking: as shown, it is not until 1936–
37 that the two curves start to drift apart. The orders of magnitude of the
implied deviations from steady state are comparable and the correlation is
high (0.79). Most importantly, we match the strong devaluation that triggers
the recovery and we nearly perfectly match the time period of undervaluation
between 1932 and 1936. Hence using a simple PPP approach or our general
equilibrium model gives qualitatively the same results.18
18Discussing different methods to measure currency misalignments Hinkel and Montiel
conclude ”one would be more confident of the results, if were determined in a complete
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If we conduct a similar exercise for the estimated world demand shock
by plotting it against an annual world manufacturing index taken from the
historical data on international merchandise trade statistics published by
the United Nations, we also find that our estimated shock mimics the actual
movements almost perfectly.
Figure 9: World Manufacturing vs. Estimated World Output
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Notes: Left axis, annual world manufacturing output index (United Na-
tions, Historical data on international merchandise trade statistics, 1953=100;
unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/imts/historical data.htm); right axis, annual averages
of estimated median world output in percentage deviations from the steady state.
To illustrate further the role of Sweden’s exchange rate policy, we conduct
a counterfactual experiment. For this purpose, we impose the hypothetical
scenario that there would not have been a real devaluation after 1930 (Figure
6), which represents a natural lower bound for the implied recovery. To be
general-equilibrium framework that takes into account all important macroeconomic inter-
actions in a fully consistent manner” (Hinkle and Montiel, 1999, p. 22).
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able to isolate the effect of the devaluation from that of the recovery of
the world economy, we also examine a scenario in which the recovery of
world demand did not occur. It is possible to simulate the model using the
hypothetical path for the terms of trade and foreign output. To compare the
outcome of the counterfactual simulations with Sweden’s actual performance,
we use annual averages of the simulated median monthly percentage changes
in output to compute a counterfactual annual industrial production series.
The results of this exercise are displayed in Figure 10.
The simulation provides an unfavorable picture. If Sweden had not de-
preciated its currency, the downturn of the Great Depression would have
been much more severe: counterfactual industrial production falls to 75% of
its 1929 level, similar to the situation in Norway (Figure 1). In reality, the
lower turning point was at about 90%. Because Sweden could rely on the de-
mand for its export goods, the recovery of foreign output would have helped
it escape the slump, but without industrial production reaching the actually
observed level. Thus, the counterfactual simulations show that a different
exchange rate policy could have eliminated Sweden’s exceptional economic
performance of the 1930s.
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Figure 10: Counterfactual Industrial Production, 1932–1937
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Notes: The dotted line depicts counterfactual yearly output in the “No Depreciation”
scenario, where the terms of trade are fixed at an overvalued level in 1930. The dashed
line depicts counterfactual annual output in the “No Recovery” scenario, which does not
allow for the revival of the world economy in 1933.
5 Conclusion
Sweden was among the first economies to recover from the depression in the
early 1930s, and it did so in a particularly impressive way. In this paper,
we test the contribution made to this recovery by economic policy. Building
on Lundberg (1983), who claimed on the basis of descriptive statistics that
Sweden consciously kept its currency undervalued vis-a`-vis the British pound,
we apply a DSGE model for a small open economy. Our results show that
Sweden’s exchange rate policy in fact had a strong impact on the course of
recovery. Indeed, Sweden would not have been able to avoid a deeper crisis
if the currency had not been relatively weak. Instead, our counterfactual
simulations indicate that industrial production would have reached its pre-
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crisis level in 1935, whereas in reality it had already achieved this two years
earlier in 1933.
This finding potentially contributes not only to the literature on the
Swedish growth miracle of the 1930s but also to the study of the Great
Depression more generally. The Riksbank in the 1930s has sometimes been
seen as an example of a central bank that was relatively innovative in terms
of the conduct of monetary policy. In particular, monetary economists have
cited the Swedish experiment with price level targeting as the prototype of
modern inflation targeting. This present paper instead argues that this view
overvalues the 1930s as a decade of policy innovation. Before and after the
collapse of the gold standard in 1931, the Riksbank was determined to have a
stable currency, believing that it was a necessary condition for international
trade. Further, the Riksbank fully rejected the idea of targeting the domestic
price level, which implied a floating exchange rate. Moreover, in order to be
more resilient in future currency crises, the Riksbank aimed at replenishing
its foreign exchange reserves by fixing the exchange rate at an undervalued
level. In other words, the strong recovery was the unintentional byproduct
of conservative central banking policy.
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